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Abstract
Ample psychological evidence suggests that people￿ s learning behavior is often
prone to a ￿myside bias￿or ￿irrational belief persistence￿in contrast to learning
behavior exclusively based on objective data. In the context of Bayesian learn-
ing such a bias may result in diverging posterior beliefs and attitude polarization
even if agents receive identical information. Such patterns cannot be explained by
the standard model of rational Bayesian learning that implies convergent beliefs.
As our key contribution, we therefore develop formal models of Bayesian learning
with psychological bias as alternatives to rational Bayesian learning. We derive
conditions under which beliefs may diverge in the learning process despite the fact
that all agents observe the same ￿arbitrarily large ￿sample, which is drawn from
an ￿objective￿i.i.d. process. Furthermore, one of our learning scenarios results in
attitude polarization even in the case of common priors. Key to our approach is
the assumption of ambiguous beliefs that are formalized as non-additive probabil-
ity measures arising in Choquet expected utility theory. As a speci￿c feature of
our approach, our models of Bayesian learning with psychological bias reduce to
rational Bayesian learning in the absence of ambiguity.
Keywords: Non-additive Probability Measures, Choquet Expected Utility The-
ory, Bayesian Learning, Bounded Rationality
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: C79, D83
￿We thank Elias Khalil, Robert ￿stling and Peter Wakker for helpful comments and suggestions.
yDepartment of Economics and Econometrics, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland
Park, 2006, South Africa. E-mail: azimper@uj.ac.za
zMannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA); Universit￿t Mannheim; L13, 17;
68131 Mannheim; Germany; Email: ludwig@mea.uni-mannheim.de.
11 Introduction
Several studies in the psychological literature demonstrate that people￿ s learning be-
havior is prone to e⁄ects such as ￿myside bias￿or ￿irrational belief persistence￿(cf.,
e.g., Baron 2007, Chapter 9). For instance, in a famous experiment by Lord, Ross,
and Lepper (1979), subjects supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed
to two purported studies, one con￿rming and one discon￿rming their existing beliefs
about the deterrent e¢ cacy of the death penalty. Despite the fact that both groups
received the same information, their learning behavior resulted in an increased ￿atti-
tude polarization￿in the sense that their respective posterior beliefs, either in favor or
against the deterrent e¢ cacy of death penalty, further diverged. Analogous results on
diverging posterior beliefs in the face of identical information have earlier been reported
by Pitz, Downing, and Reinhold (1967), Pitz (1969) and Chapman (1973) in the con-
text of Bayesian updating of subjective probabilities. In violation of Bayes￿update rule
the subjects in these experiments formed biased posteriors that supported their original
opinions rather than taking into account the evidence. The learning behavior elicited
in these experiments cannot be explained by the standard model of rational Bayesian
learning according to which di⁄erences in agents￿prior beliefs must decrease rather than
increase whenever the agents receive identical information. In the economics literature,
similar phenomena are reported by Kandel and Pearson (1995) who document di⁄er-
ential interpretation of identical information through public announcements by traders
in stock markets. Models of rational Bayesian learning thus apparently ignore relevant
aspects of real-life people￿ s learning behavior.
In this paper we present closed-form models of Bayesian learning that allow for the
possibility of a ￿myside bias￿as a generalization of a standard rational Bayesian learn-
ing model that was introduced to the economics literature by Tonks (1983), Viscusi and
O￿ Connor (1984) and Viscusi (1985). As our point of departure we assume that the par-
adigm of rational Bayesian learning may only be violated by agents who have ambiguous
beliefs. That is, the beliefs of these agents cannot be described by additive probability
measures alone but additionally re￿ ect the agent￿ s personal attitudes. The impact of
new information on an agent￿ s beliefs is then two-fold. On the one hand, we take into
account ￿rational￿updating based on objective empirical evidence in accordance with
our standard model of rational Bayesian learning. On the other hand, however, we also
assume existence of a ￿myside bias￿that results in an ￿irrational￿enforcement of the
agents￿personal attitudes.
In our formal model a decision maker resolves his uncertainty about the ￿true￿
parameter value of a Bernoulli trial, e.g., the probability that a given coin turns up heads,
by some prior belief. In contrast to standard models of Bayesian learning, however, we
2consider a decision maker who is ambiguous whereby we formally describe ambiguity by
non-additive probability measures, i.e., capacities, that arise in Choquet Expected Utility
(CEU) theory (Schmeidler 1986,1989; Gilboa 1987).1 A decision maker￿ s prior estimate
of the parameter is then given as the Choquet expected value of possible parameter-
values with respect to such ambiguous beliefs. In order to focus our analysis, we further
restrict attention to neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and
Grant (2007) according to which an agent￿ s non-additive belief about the likelihood
of an event is a weighted average of an ambiguous part and an additive part. More
speci￿cally, we assume that the additive part of the neo-additive capacity is described
by some distribution of the Beta-distributions family. Under these assumptions, the
decision maker￿ s prior belief about the true parameter value is a weighted average of
the ambiguous part and the expected value of the Beta-distribution. According to our
interpretation, the expected value of this Beta-distribution is the decision maker￿ s best
rational guess about the ￿true￿value of the parameter. The ambiguous part of his prior
belief is relevant whenever the agent lacks absolute con￿dence in this guess. This lack of
con￿dence is resolved in our model by a parameter that measures the agent￿ s optimistic
versus pessimistic personal attitudes with respect to ambiguity.
In a next step we analyze how the decision maker revises his prior belief in light of
new information about the outcomes of i.i.d. Bernoulli trials. To this end we consider
a decision maker who uses some Bayesian update rule to generate a conditional non-
additive probability measure so that his posterior estimate about the parameter is given
as the Choquet expected value with respect to this posterior capacity. In the case of
non-additive probability measures there exist several perceivable Bayesian update rules
expressing di⁄erent psychological attitudes towards the interpretation of new information
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Sarin and Wakker 1998). In particular, we analyze the
consequences of the so-called full Bayesian (Pires 2002; Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey
2006; Siniscalchi 2001, 2006) as well as the optimistic and the pessimistic update rules
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Sarin and Wakker 1998). An application of these update
rules to some prior belief where the agent expresses ambiguity results in a Bayesian
learning process that di⁄ers from rational Bayesian learning in that convergence to the
￿true￿probabilities of some objective random process will - in general - not emerge.
Rather, updating of beliefs reinforces optimistic, respectively pessimistic, attitudes of
the agent thereby giving rise to learning behavior with a ￿myside bias￿ .
Using this Bayesian learning model we then analyze the beliefs of two heterogeneous
agents who have some prior beliefs, receive identical information and then update their
1CEU theory was originally developed to describe ambiguity attitudes that may explain Ellsberg
paradoxes (Ellsberg 1961).
3beliefs according to some Bayesian update rule with psychological bias. Thereby, we
di⁄erentiate between a weak and a strong form of myside bias. The weak form of
myside bias is characterized by diverging posterior beliefs of the agents under repeated
learning with identical information whereby the beliefs may move into the same direction.
According to our interpretation the strong form of myside bias is equivalent to attitude
polarization in the sense that the posterior estimates of the two agents move into opposite
directions under repeated learning with identical information. To derive our main results
we then consider two scenarios: In our ￿rst scenario the two agents have di⁄erent initial
beliefs and update their beliefs based on the same information by applying the same
update rule. In our second scenario, the two agents receive the same information but
apply di⁄erent update rules. In both scenarios the resulting posterior beliefs may exhibit
the weak as well as the strong form of myside bias. Notice that, in order to derive our
result in the second scenario, we do not require that the agents have di⁄erent prior
beliefs.
The remainder of our analysis is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
related literature. Section 3 presents our benchmark model of Bayesian learning with
non-ambiguous beliefs and Section 4 introduces ambiguous beliefs. Section 5 discusses
updating of ambiguous beliefs under the three di⁄erent update rules ￿full Bayesian,
optimistic and pessimistic updating ￿that we consider in this paper. In Section 6 we
derive, under the assumption of Bayesian learning, long-run limit estimates that, in
general, do not converge to true probabilities. Section 7 then presents our main results
on weak and strong myside bias in the form of diverging beliefs and attitude polarization.
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Learning with additive beliefs
In our learning model agents revise their probability assessments about the parameters
of some stochastic process, e.g., about the probability that a given coin turns up heads
or tails, by Bayesian updating. Accordingly, agents have some prior beliefs and form
posterior beliefs given the relative frequencies observed in the data. In contrast, accord-
ing to the frequentist approach, agents learn probabilities by simply adopting relative
frequencies observed in a given data sample. Within the frequentist approach, diver-
gence of probability assessments of agents cannot occur if the data are drawn from a
stationary stochastic process. Against this background, Kurz (1994a,b, 1996) assumes a
4non-stationary stochastic process and thereby establishes conditions under which agents
may not agree about fundamentals in the long run even if they observe the same data
sample. However, the application of a frequentist learning rule in a non-stationary en-
vironment is not fully consistent because the rationale for agents to apply a frequentist
rule for inferring probabilities when the ￿underlying￿probabilities cannot be learnt by
this rule is not clear.2
While divergence of beliefs can thus not occur within the frequentist framework in a
stationary environment, a similar observation holds true within the Bayesian framework
when restricted to additive beliefs. Part of our analysis below is based on a speci￿c model
of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs according to which the agents￿uncertainty with
respect to the parameter of a Binomial distribution is described by a Beta-distribution.
The fact that additive posteriors converge to the same limit belief in this model, however,
can be regarded as a special case of more general results on the consistency of (additive)
Bayesian estimates, in particular Doob￿ s consistency theorem (Doob 1949; for extensions
see Breiman, LeCam, and Schwartz 1964; Lijoi, Pruenster, and Walker 2004). We next
brie￿ y review some relevant convergence results.
Formally, consider a sequence of coordinate random variables (Xn)n￿1 on some
measurable space (S1;S1) taking values in some complete separable metric space S.
In particular, let S1 = ￿1
i=1S and let S1 denote the Borel ￿-algebra generated by
X1;X2;:::. Further consider a family of additive (conditional) probability measures
fQ(￿ j ￿) j ￿ 2 ￿g on the space (S;S) with S denoting the Borel ￿-algebra in S. We
interpret the complete separable metric space ￿ as the set of possible parameter values
and we assume that ￿ 7! Q(￿ j ￿) is one-one. For given ￿, we denote by Q1 (￿ j ￿)
the product measure on (S1;S1). Let B denote the Borel ￿-algebra in ￿ and de￿ne
￿ = ￿ ￿ S1 and F = B ￿ S1 for the standard product ￿-algebra. If ￿ is an additive
probability measure on (￿;B), then the additive probability measure P on (￿;F) is
uniquely de￿ned by











for any B 2 B and A = A1 ￿ ::: ￿ An ￿ S1 2 S1 for any n. The probability measure
￿ stands here for the agent￿ s prior (distribution) of the S1-measurable random variable
~ ￿ which captures the agent￿ s uncertainty about the true parameter value. The agent￿ s
posterior (distribution) of ~ ￿ given the observation, i.e., data, Xn (!) = X1 (!) ￿ ::: ￿
2While agents in our model also apply learning rules by which they will not learn ￿underlying￿prob-
abilities, we motivate the application of these rules by psychological and decision-theoretic arguments.
5Xn (!) is then, by Bayes￿rule, de￿ned as the conditional probability measure










Q(Xi (!) j ￿)￿(d￿)
for any B 2 B if the denominator is not zero. The pair (￿;￿(￿ j Xn)) is said to be
consistent i⁄, for Q1 (￿ j ￿)-almost all sequences of observations, the posterior ￿(￿ j Xn)
converges in the weak topology to a probability measure putting probability mass one
on every neighborhood of ￿. That is, if the Bayesian posterior ￿(￿ j Xn) is consistent for
a given parameter value ￿ then the Bayesian estimate for ￿, de￿ned by the conditional
expected value E [~ ￿ j ￿(￿ j Xn)], converges with probability one to ￿ as n gets large.
According to Doob￿ s consistency theorem (1949), the pair (￿;￿(￿ j Xn)) is consistent for
￿-almost all values in ￿. Thus, only for parameter values in a subset of ￿ with prior
probability of zero the Bayesian estimate may not converge to the true parameter value.
Moreover, Freedman (1963) establishes for ￿nite S that (￿;￿(￿ j Xn)) is consistent if
and only if ￿ is in the support of the prior ￿. As a consequence, if the random variables
X1;X2;::: can take on only ￿nitely many values, an agent￿ s Bayesian estimate will almost
surely converge to the true parameter value if his prior has full support on ￿.
Related to Doob￿ s consistency theorem is Blackwell and Dubins￿(1962) convergence
theorem. While this convergence theorem does not explicitly refer to Bayesian posteriors,
it is relevant to the literature on attitude polarization because it investigates convergence
of two sequences of conditional probabilities that start out from di⁄erent initial points.
More speci￿cally, Blackwell and Dubins consider two di⁄erent additive probability mea-
sures P and P 0 on the measurable space (S1;S1) as de￿ned above. According to
Blackwell and Dubins, if these two agents agree on all events with probability zero, the
two conditional probability measures P (￿ j Xn);P 0 (￿ j Xn) almost surely merge in the
absolute variation norm. That is, if two agents start out with di⁄erent beliefs about the
probability that governs the process (Xn)n￿1, their conditional probabilities about future
events, i.e., P (Xn+1 ￿ Xn+2 ￿ ::: j Xn) and P 0 (Xn+1 ￿ Xn+2 ￿ ::: j Xn), almost surely
merge as n gets large. Diaconis and Freedman (1986, Theorem 3) establish a formal link
between Doob￿ s consistency theorem and Blackwell and Dubins￿convergence theorem
by basically showing that the Bayesian posterior ￿(￿ j Xn) is consistent if and only if
the conditional probability measures P (￿ j Xn);P 0 (￿ j Xn) merge in the weak topology
for any P 0.
In light of the above convergence results it is practically impossible to establish (at
least for a ￿nite set S) attitude polarization, or even non-converging posteriors, within
the framework of Bayesian learners with additive beliefs if all agents observe the same
6sample information drawn from an i.i.d. process. In order to account for the empirical
phenomenon of non-converging posteriors or/and attitude polarization, however, several
authors have tried to circumvent these convergence results within the framework of
Bayesian learning with additive beliefs. One approach is to restrict attention to the
possibility of a short-run bias only, thereby deliberately ignoring long-run convergence
(e.g., Brav and Heaton 2002; Dixit and Weibull 2007). Another line of research is to look
into the possibility of weakening the i.i.d. assumption of the above framework. E.g.,
Lewellen and Shanken (2002) consider cases in which the mean of an exogenous dividend
process may not be constant over time. Consequently, the agent can never fully learn the
objective parameters of the underlying distribution because observed frequencies do not
admit any conclusions about objective probabilities even in the long run. Along the same
line, Weitzman (2007) considers a non-stationary exogenous stochastic process so that
there is no ￿true￿parameter that could be learnt by the agents. Furthermore, within
the context of attitude polarization, Kandel and Pearson (1995) and, more recently,
Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz (2007) consider two agents with di⁄erent prior-
distributions about imprecise signals from an i.i.d. process. Since these di⁄erent priors
imply di⁄erent interpretation of new information, these authors avoid convergence of
both agents￿posteriors according to Doob￿ s consistency theorem because these posteriors
are e⁄ectively formed by observing two di⁄erent stochastic processes.
2.2 Learning under ambiguity
While the above approaches try - in one way or another - to reconcile the possibility of
attitude polarization with Bayesian learning under the assumption of additive beliefs,
our approach drops the assumption of additive beliefs altogether. As a consequence,
Doob￿ s consistency theorem does not apply in our framework so that agents￿non-additive
posteriors may diverge in the long-run despite the fact that they observe the same data
drawn from an i.i.d. process. Moreover, our approach may even allow for diverging
posteriors and attitude polarization in the case that agents start out with identical
priors. This is impossible for models of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs because
additivity implies a unique Bayesian update rule.
Related to our approach, Marinacci (1999) studies a learning environment with non-
additive beliefs whereby he considers a decision maker who observes an experiment
such that the outcomes at each trial are identically and independently distributed with
respect to the decision-maker￿ s non-additive belief.3 In this setup, Marinacci derives for
3Notice that there are several perceivable de￿nitions of independence for capacities. Very loosely
speaking, in the context of conditional capacities Marinacci￿ s notion of independence corresponds to
the optimistic update rule, ensuring that ￿ (A j B) = ￿ (A) if A and B are independent with respect to
7(basically convex) capacities laws of large numbers as counterparts to the additive case
thereby admitting for the possibility that ambiguity does not vanish in the long-run.
While Marinacci￿ s approach may thus be regarded as a frequentist approach towards
non-additive probabilities, our approach is a Bayesian one according to which an agent
has a subjective prior belief over the whole event space while he uses sample information
from an objective process in order to update his subjective belief. In contrast to our
approach the learning behavior of di⁄erent agents in Marinacci￿ s model must converge
to the same limit if they have identical priors. As a consequence there cannot occur
attitude polarization within Marinacci￿ s framework under the assumption of common
priors.
Epstein and Schneider (2007) also consider a model of learning under ambiguity which
shares with our learning model the feature that ambiguity does not necessarily vanish
in the long run. Their learning model is based on the recursive multiple priors approach
(Epstein and Wang 1994; Epstein and Schneider 2003) that restricts conditional max
min expected utility (MMEU) preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) such that
dynamic consistency is satis￿ed. While MMEU theory is closely related to CEU theory
restricted to convex capacities (e.g., neo-additive capacities for which the degree of opti-
mism is zero), the similarity between Epstein and Schneider￿ s approach and our learning
model ends here. As one main di⁄erence, the restriction of Epstein and Schneider￿ s ap-
proach to dynamically consistent preferences excludes preferences that violate Savage￿ s
sure-thing principle as elicited in Ellsberg paradoxes (cf. observation 3 in this paper).
Since our learning model does not exclude dynamically inconsistent decision behavior,
it can accommodate a broader notion of ambiguity attitudes than the Epstein-Schneider
approach, including ambiguity attitudes that are not compatible with the sure-thing
principle. Furthermore, Epstein and Schneider establish long-run ambiguity, i.e., the
existence of multiple posteriors, under the assumption that the decision-maker perma-
nently receives ambiguous signals, which they formalize via a multitude of di⁄erent
likelihood functions at each information stage in addition to the existence of multiple
priors.4 This introduction of multiple likelihoods is rather ad hoc and it would be inter-
esting to see an axiomatic or/and psychological foundation of this approach which goes
beyond the mere technical property that multiple likelihoods can sustain long-run am-
biguity in the recursive multiple priors framework. On the contrary, our ￿comparably
simple ￿axiomatically founded model of Bayesian learning with psychological attitudes
o⁄ers a rather straightforward explanation for biased long-run beliefs even in the case
the capacity ￿.
4In the case of learning from ambiguous urns without multiple likelihoods, ambiguity obviously
vanishes in the learning process; (for a formal result see Marinachi 2002).
8that the decision-maker receives signals that are not ambiguous.
3 The benchmark case: Rational Bayesian learning
In this section we describe in detail a closed-form learning model with additive beliefs
as introduced to the economics literature by Viscusi and O￿ Connor (1984) and Viscusi
(1985). Consider the situation of an agent who is uncertain about the probability of
an outcome, H, but can observe a statistical experiment with n independent trials
where H, resp. T, is a possible outcome that occurs identical probability. Formally, we
consider a sequence of coordinate random variables (Xn)n￿1 on the measurable space
(S1;S1) taking on values in S = f0;1g which count how many times outcome H
occurs in the trial. Let S1 = ￿1
i=1S and de￿ne S1 as the power-set of S1. Our
parameter space is (￿;B) such that ￿ = [0;1] is endowed with the Euclidean metric
and B denotes the Borel ￿-algebra in ￿. As family of additive (conditional) probability




x (1 ￿ ￿)
x￿1 j ￿ 2 ￿
￿
with x 2 S.
We further assume that the agent￿ s prior ￿ of ~ ￿ is given by some Beta distribution,
which is, for given parameters ￿;￿ > 0, characterized by the density function
K￿;￿￿￿￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1 for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
0 else
where K￿;￿ is a normalizing constant.5
Observe now that the joint-probability measure P on (￿;F) with ￿ = ￿ ￿ S1 and
F = B ￿ S1 is uniquely de￿ned by






for any B 2 B and A = A1 ￿ ::: ￿ An ￿ S1 2 S1 for any n. For our purpose it is
convenient to denote by ￿ the event in F such that ￿ 2 ￿ is the true probability of
outcome H, i.e.,
￿ = f! 2 ￿ j ~ ￿ (!) = ￿g.
Similarly, let Ik
n denote the event in F such that outcome H has occurred k-times in the





! 2 ￿ j ~ In (!) = k
o
5In particular, K￿;￿ =
￿(￿+￿)
￿(￿)￿(￿) where ￿(y) =
1 R
0
xy￿1e￿xdx for y > 0.
9whereby the Sn-measurable random variable ~ In counts the number of occurrences of H.
Since the probability of receiving information Ik
n for a given ￿ (=likelihood function) is













k (1 ￿ ￿)
n￿k ,
we obtain by Bayes￿rule the following posterior probability (density) that ￿ is the true
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The agent￿ s prior estimate for the true probability of H is given by the expected value
of his prior on ~ ￿, i.e., E [~ ￿;￿]. Accordingly, the agent￿ s posterior estimate for ￿ given
information Ik








. In the case of a Beta prior we therefore obtain as prior estimate
E [~ ￿;￿] = ￿
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n is the sample mean. That is, the agent￿ s posterior estimate for the probability
of H is a weighted average of his prior estimate and the sample mean whereby the weight
attached to the sample mean increases in the number of trials.6 Let ￿￿ denote the ￿true￿
probability of outcome H. If the number of trials approaches in￿nity, i.e., n ! 1,
the sample mean information Ik
n converges in probability to the sample information
I￿ according to which outcome H has occurred with relative frequency ￿￿. That is, for
every c > 0, limn!1 prob
￿￿ ￿Ik
n ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ c
￿
= 1. As a consequence, we obtain the following
consistency result for this speci￿c model of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs.







for the probability of outcome
H converge in probability to the true probability ￿￿ as n gets large.
6Tonks (1983) introduces a similar model of rational Bayesian learning in which the agent has a
normally distributed prior over the mean of some normal distribution and receives normally distributed
information.
10Apparently, this standard model of rational Bayesian learning cannot account for
the learning behavior of agents whose posterior beliefs systematically diverge while they
receive the same sample information drawn from an i.i.d. process.
Remark. Observe that if the agent￿ s information Ik
n about the sample mean is
always precise in the sense that Ik
n = k
n for all n, the limit information I￿ equals some
point in the unit-interval, implying ￿(I￿) = 0 by the de￿nition of a Beta-distribution. A
more interesting (and general) case would be to allow for imprecise information about




n ￿ "n; k
n + "n
￿
￿ [0;1] so that we may have ￿(I￿) ￿ 0
since, e.g., I￿ = [￿￿ ￿ "￿;￿￿ + "￿] with "￿ ￿ 0. If, in addition, the agent￿ s estimate about







n is some subjective probability distribution
for the random variable xk
n with support on Ik
n), always coincides with the true sample-







n for all n, the limit results of observation 1 would identically
apply to this learning scenario with imprecise information. In the remainder of the paper
we will henceforth admit for the case that 0 ￿ ￿(I￿) < 1 while E [~ ￿;￿(￿ j I￿)] = ￿￿ is
nevertheless satis￿ed with probability one
4 Ambiguous beliefs
We assume that individuals exhibit ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler (1989)
and who may thus, for example, commit paradoxes of the Ellsberg type (Ellsberg 1961).
Following Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987), we describe such individuals as Choquet
Expected Utility (CEU) decision makers, that is, they maximize expected utility with
respect to non-additive beliefs. Properties of non-additive beliefs are used in the litera-
ture for formal de￿nitions of, e.g., ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler 1989;
Epstein 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacchi 2002), pessimism and optimism (Eichberger
and Kelsey 1999; Wakker 2001; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant 2006), as well as
sensitivity to changes in likelihood (Wakker 2004). The Choquet expected value of a
bounded random variable Y : ￿ ! R with respect to capacity ￿ is formally de￿ned as




(￿ (f! 2 ￿ j Y (!) ￿ zg) ￿ 1)dz +
Z +1
0
￿ f! 2 ￿ j Y (!) ￿ zgdz. (2)
Our own approach focuses on non-additive beliefs that are de￿ned as neo-additive
capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007).
11De￿nition. For a given measurable space (￿;F) the neo-additive capacity, ￿, is de-
￿ned, for some ￿;￿ 2 [0;1] by
￿ (A) = ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ !
o (A) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ !
p (A)) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A) (3)
for all A 2 F such that ￿ is some additive probability measure and we have for
the non-additive capacities !o
!
o (A) = 1 if A 6= ;
!
o (A) = 0 if A = ;
and !p respectively
!
p (A) = 0 if A 6= ￿
!
p (A) = 1 if A = ￿.
The following observation extends a result (Lemma 3.1) of Chateauneuf, Eichberger,
and Grant (2007) for ￿nite random variables to the more general case of random variables
with a closed and bounded support.
Observation 2. Let Y be a closed and bounded random variable. Then the Choquet
expected value (2) of Y with respect to a neo-additive capacity (3) is given by
E [Y;￿] = ￿ (￿maxY + (1 ￿ ￿)minY ) + (1 ￿ ￿)E [Y;￿]. (4)
Proof: Relegated to the appendix.￿
Neo-additive capacities can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that stand for de-
viations from additive beliefs such that a parameter ￿ (degree of ambiguity) measures
the lack of con￿dence the decision maker has in some subjective additive probability
distribution ￿. Obviously, if there is no ambiguity, i.e., ￿ = 0, (4) reduces to the stan-
dard subjective expected utility representation of Savage (1954). In case there is some
ambiguity, however, the second parameter ￿ measures how much weight the decision
maker puts on the best possible outcome of Y when resolving his ambiguity. Conversely,
(1 ￿ ￿) is the weight he puts on the worst possible outcome of Y . As a consequence, we
interpret ￿ as an ￿optimism under ambiguity￿parameter whereby ￿ = 1, resp. ￿ = 0,
12corresponds to extreme optimism, resp. extreme pessimism, with respect to resolving
ambiguity in the decision maker￿ s belief.
Finally, observe that for non-degenerate events, i.e., A = 2 f;;￿g, the neo-additive
capacity ￿ in (3), simpli￿es to
￿ (A) = ￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A): (5)
5 Updating ambiguous beliefs
CEU theory has been developed in order to accommodate paradoxes of the Ellsberg
type which show that real-life decision-makers violate Savage￿ s sure-thing principle. In
this section we demonstrate that abandoning the sure-thing principle bears two impor-
tant implications for conditional CEU preferences over Savage-acts. First, in contrast
to Bayesian updating of additive probability measures, there exist several perceivable
Bayesian update rules for non-additive probability measures (cf. Gilboa and Schmeidler
1993, Sarin and Wakker 1998, Pires 2002, Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey 2006, Siniscalchi
2001, 2006). Second, any preferences that (strictly) violate the sure-thing principle can-
not be updated in a dynamically consistent way. That is, there does not exist any up-
dating rule for capacities such that ex-ante CEU preferences that (strictly) violate the
sure-thing principle are updated in a dynamically consistent manner to ex-post CEU
preferences.
To see this de￿ne the Savage-act fBh : ￿ ! X such that
fBh(!) =
(
f (!) for ! 2 B
h(!) for ! 2 :B
where B is some non-empty event. Recall that Savage￿ s sure-thing principle states that,
for all acts f;g;h;h0 and all events B 2 F,
fBh ￿ gBh implies fBh
0 ￿ gBh
0. (6)
Let us interpret event B as new information received by the agent. The sure-thing princi-
ple then implies a straightforward way for deriving ex-post preferences ￿B, conditional
on the new information B, from the agent￿ s original preferences ￿ over Savage-acts.
Namely, we have
f ￿B g if and only if fBh ￿ gBh for any h, (7)
implying for a subjective EU decision-maker
f ￿B g , E [u(f);￿(￿ j B)] ￿ E [u(g);￿(￿ j B)]
13where u : X ! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and ￿(￿ j B) is a
conditional additive probability measure de￿ned, for all A;B 2 F such that ￿(B) > 0,
by




It is well known that the updating of EU preferences satis￿es dynamic consistency,
which - informally - states that there are no strict ex-post incentives for deviating from
an ex-ante optimal plan of actions. Formally, we de￿ne dynamic consistency in terms of
update rules, i.e., rules that derive conditional preferences, f￿Bg for all events B, from
an ex-ante preference ordering ￿.
De￿nition: Dynamic Consistency. We speak of a dynamically consistent update
rule i⁄ for all (￿information￿ ) partitions P ￿ F and all Savage-acts f;g, f ￿B g
for all B 2 P implies f ￿ g.
Observation 3. There does not exist any dynamically consistent update rule for pref-
erences ￿ that strictly violate the sure-thing principle.
Proof: For preferences that strictly violate the sure-thing principle we have, for
some f and g,
fBh ￿ gBh and gBh
0 ￿ fBh
0 for some h 6= h
0 and some B.
Observe that any update rule for preferences must result in conditional preferences
f ￿B g or g ￿B f. Consider at ￿rst the case f ￿B g. Since h0 ￿:B h0, dynamic
consistency implies fBh0 ￿ gBh0, a contradiction to gBh0 ￿ fBh0 by the de￿nition of a
preference ordering. Now consider the case g ￿B f. Since h ￿:B h, dynamic consistency
implies gBh ￿ fBh, a contradiction to fBh ￿ gBh.￿
In case the sure-thing principle does not hold, the speci￿cation of act h in (7) is no
longer arbitrary so that there exist for CEU preferences several possibilities of deriving
ex post preferences from ex ante preferences. That is, in a CEU framework there exist
several perceivable ways of de￿ning a conditional capacity ￿ (￿ j B) such that
f ￿B g , E [u(f);￿ (￿ j B)] ￿ E [u(g);￿ (￿ j B)].
14Let us at ￿rst consider conditional CEU preferences satisfying, for all acts f;g,
f ￿B g if and only if fBh ￿ gBh
where h is the so-called conditional certainty equivalent of g, i.e., h is the constant act
such that g ￿B h. The corresponding Bayesian update rule for the non-additive beliefs
of a CEU decision maker is the so-called full Bayesian update rule which is given as
follows (Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey 2006)
￿
FB (A j B) =
￿ (A \ B)
￿ (A \ B) + 1 ￿ ￿ (A [ :B)
(8)
where ￿FB (A j B) denotes the conditional capacity for event A 2 F given information
cell B 2 P.
Observation 4: An application of the full Bayesian update rule (8) to a prior belief
(5) results in the posterior belief=0
￿
FB (A j B) = ￿
FB












￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
. (10)
Proof: Relegated to the appendix. ￿
In addition to the full Bayesian update rule we also consider so-called h-Bayesian
update rules for preferences ￿ over Savage acts as introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler





for all events B, such that for all acts f;g
f ￿
h




with x￿ denoting the best and x￿ denoting the worst consequence possible and E 2 F.
For the so-called optimistic update rule h is the constant act where E = ;. That is,
under the optimistic update rule the null-event, :B, becomes associated with the worst
consequence possible. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) o⁄er the following psychological
motivation for this update rule:
15￿[...] when comparing two actions given a certain event B, the decision maker implicitly
assumes that had B not occurred, the worst possible outcome [...] would have
resulted. In other words, the behavior given B [...] exhibits ￿ happiness￿that B
has occurred; the decisions are made as if we are always in ￿ the best of all possible
worlds￿ .￿
As corresponding optimistic Bayesian update rule for conditional beliefs of CEU
decision makers we obtain
￿
opt (A j B) =
￿ (A \ B)
￿ (B)
: (13)
Observation 5: An application of the optimistic update rule (13) to a prior belief (5)
such that
NOT (￿ = 1 AND ￿ = 0) (14)
results in the conditional belief
￿














￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
.
Proof: Relegated to the appendix. ￿
For the pessimistic (or Dempster-Shafer) update rule h is the constant act where E =
￿, associating with the null-event,:B, the best consequence possible. The psychological
interpretation for this update rule according to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) is as
follows:
￿[...] we consider a ￿ pessimistic￿decision maker, whose choices reveal the hidden as-
sumption that all the impossible worlds are the best conceivable ones.￿
The corresponding pessimistic Bayesian update rule for CEU decision makers is
￿
pess (A j B) =
￿ (A [ :B) ￿ ￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ (:B)
: (15)
16Observation 6: An application of the pessimistic update rule (15) to a prior belief (5)
such that
NOT (￿ = 1 AND ￿ = 1) (16)
results in the conditional belief
￿
pess (A j B) = (1 ￿ ￿
pess





￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
.
Proof: Relegated to the appendix. ￿
Remark. Observe that the conditions (14) and (16) are consistency conditions which
ensure that the denominator in the according conditional capacity is not zero so that the
conditional capacities are well-de￿ned. In the remainder of the paper we will assume that
(14) and (16) hold without explicitly mentioning it. To see the intuition behind these
consistency conditions notice that (14), resp. (16), states that extremely pessimistic,
resp. optimistic, priors should not be updated by the optimistic, resp. pessimistic, rule.
6 Learning with ambiguous beliefs
In this section we formally link the updating of ambiguous beliefs to Bayesian learning
behavior. As a generalization of the Bayesian learning model discussed in Section 3, we
consider now a neo-additive prior about the unknown parameter ￿ such that
￿ (￿) =
(
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ K￿;￿￿￿￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1 for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
0 else
(17)
i.e., the additive part of this prior is some Beta-distribution. Accordingly, the agent￿ s
prior estimate for the true value of ￿ is now given as the Choquet expected value of his
neo-additive prior, i.e.,
E [~ ￿;￿] = ￿ (￿max ~ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)min ~ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)E [~ ￿;￿]
= ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E [~ ￿;￿]
by observation 2 and the fact that ~ ￿ has full support on [0;1]. The following lemma uses
our results (observations 4-6) on Bayesian updating of neo-additive capacities in order to
derive conditional neo-additive capacities for the special case (17). The corresponding
17conditional Choquet expected values stand for the agent￿ s posterior estimate of the
￿true￿probability of outcome H.
Lemma. Suppose the agent receives sample information Ik
n 2 B ￿ S. Contingent on
the applied update rule we obtain the following conditional neo-additive beliefs and







is given by (1).
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18In the limit of a Bayesian learning process the agent￿ s posterior estimates about ￿ will
then converge to E [~ ￿;￿ (￿ j I￿)], whose value depends on the applied Bayesian update
rule. The following corollary to the above lemma characterizes these limit estimates.
Thereby, we use the fact that the additive part of the neo-additive beliefs converges in












￿￿ ￿ ￿ c
￿
= 1
for some c > 0.
Corollary. Let n ! 1. Contingent on the applied update rule the agent￿ s estimates
about the probability of outcome H converge in probability to the following posterior
estimates.






















￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
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￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
:
(iii) Pessimistic Bayesian learning.
E [~ ￿;￿
pess (￿ j I
￿)] = (1 ￿ ￿
pess






￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
.
Consider the situation that di⁄erent learners start out with identical neo-additive
priors. The following result formally con￿rms our intuition that a pessimistic learner will
end up with a smaller posterior estimate about ￿ than a full Bayesian learner who in turn
ends up with a smaller posterior estimate than an optimistic learner. Furthermore, while
19an optimistic (pessimistic) learner will always overestimate (underestimate) the true
probability of the i.i.d. process, a full Bayesian learner will overestimate (underestimate)
this true probability if and only if it is smaller (greater) than his original degree of
optimism.
Observation 7: Suppose that ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1). Then
E [~ ￿;￿














Moreover, with respect to any ￿true￿probability ￿￿ 2 (0;1) we have for these limit
estimates
E [~ ￿;￿
















￿ i⁄ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿.
Proof: Relegated to the appendix. ￿
7 Diverging posteriors and attitude polarization
We are now ready to state and prove our main results whereby we suppose that agents
have received the same (limit) sample information from the statistical experiment. To
focus our analysis we only consider interesting di⁄erences between the agents￿learning
behavior. In particular, we di⁄erentiate between two relevant cases of heterogenous
learning behavior. On the one hand, we consider full Bayesian learners who have di⁄er-
ent initial attitudes with respect to optimism under ambiguity implying di⁄erent prior
beliefs. On the other hand, we consider agents who may have identical prior beliefs but
have di⁄erent, i.e., optimistic resp. pessimistic, attitudes with respect to the interpreta-
tion of new information.
Formally, consider a set of agents, I, such that, for every agent i 2 I, the prior about
the parameter ￿ is given by
￿i (￿) =
(
￿i￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ K￿i;￿i￿￿i￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿i￿1 for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
0 else.
For the sake of expositional clarity, we restrict attention to the case in which di⁄erences
in initial beliefs of agents can only be due to their respective optimism parameters ￿i,
i 2 I, under ambiguity.
20Assumption 1. The priors of all agents i 2 I satisfy ￿i = ￿, ￿i = ￿, and ￿i = ￿ for
some parameter values ￿;￿;￿.
By the following assumption we restrict attention to the interesting case of non-
degenerate objective probabilities.7
Assumption 2. The ￿true￿probability ￿￿ is non-degenerate, i.e., ￿￿ 2 (0;1).
As our ￿rst main result (proposition 1) we identify conditions under which posterior
beliefs diverge such that the directed distance between the posterior beliefs of the two
agents is strictly greater than the directed distance between their priors. That is, our
￿rst result refers to diverging posteriors in the following sense.
De￿nition (Diverging Posteriors). Let I = f1;2g. We say that both agents￿
posteriors strictly diverge i⁄
E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿ j I
￿)] ￿ E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿ j I
￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿)] ￿ E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿)] (18)
whereby
E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿)] ￿ E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿)]. (19)
According to our concept of strictly diverging posteriors, the repeated learning of
identical information will widen any initial gap in prior beliefs whereby the posteriors
may move in the same direction. We also refer to this divergence in beliefs as a weak
form of myside bias.
Proposition 1. (Diverging Posteriors)
Let I = f1;2g and suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 are satis￿ed.
(i) Assume that both agents are full Bayesian learners. Then the agents￿posteriors
strictly diverge if and only if ￿ > 0 and ￿1 > ￿2.
7While an extension to the case ￿￿ 2 [0;1] is straightforward, we avoid by assumption 2 the discussion
of tedious boundary conditions which would not add to the understanding of our general ￿ndings.
21(ii) Assume that agent 1 is an optimistic whereas agent 2 is a pessimistic Bayesian
learner. Then the agents￿posteriors strictly diverge if and only if ￿ > 0 and
￿1 ￿ ￿2.
Proof: Relegated to the appendix.
Our second main result (proposition 2) focuses on conditions that ensure attitude
polarization. Attitude polarization in our sense is a stronger concept than mere diver-
gence of posteriors in that it additionally requires that the posteriors move in opposite
directions. We also refer to this divergence in beliefs as a strong form of myside bias.
Formally, we consider the following de￿nition of attitude polarization.
De￿nition (Attitude Polarization). Let I = f1;2g. We say that both agents￿
attitudes become strictly polarized i⁄
E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿ j I
￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿)] ￿ E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿ j I
￿)]. (20)
In order to further focus our analysis we restrict attention to the case in which the
additive part of the prior estimate coincides with the objective probability.
Assumption 3. The priors of all agents i 2 I satisfy E [~ ￿;￿(￿)] = ￿￿.
Proposition 2. (Attitude Polarization I)
Let I = f1;2g and suppose that assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satis￿ed.
(i) Assume that both agents are full Bayesian learners. Then the agents￿attitudes
become strictly polarized if and only if ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿1 > ￿2, and
￿1 > ￿
￿ > ￿2. (21)
(ii) Assume that agent 1 is an optimistic whereas agent 2 is a pessimistic Bayesian
learner. Then the agents￿ attitudes become strictly polarized if and only if
￿ > 0 and ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
22Proof: Relegated to the appendix.
Our formal de￿nitions of ￿diverging posteriors￿and ￿attitude polarization￿capture
the idea that the agents￿posteriors diverge rather than converge despite the fact that
they receive the same information. The results of propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that
this weak, respectively strong, form of a myside bias may occur in di⁄erent learning
scenarios. While the results of propositions 1(i) and 2(i) are driven by the initial gap in
prior beliefs, the results of propositions 1(ii) and 2(ii) build upon the di⁄erent learning
rules of the agents. According to condition (21) attitude polarization for full Bayesian
learners rather occurs if the di⁄erence in initial beliefs is large, i.e., strong optimism
of agent 1 versus strong pessimism of agent 2. Such a di⁄erence in prior beliefs is not
necessary for attitude polarization in case the agents apply di⁄erent learning rules. That
is, even agents with common priors may experience diverging posteriors and attitude
polarization if they interpret new information di⁄erently.
Finally, the following proposition shows that whenever full Bayesian learners express
attitude polarization, the magnitude of attitude polarization between an optimistic and
a pessimistic learner will be even more signi￿cant. This (intuitive) result is an immediate
consequence of observation 7.
Proposition 3. (Attitude Polarization II)
Let I = f1;:::;4g and suppose that assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satis￿ed whereby we
have for the agents￿priors
￿1 = ￿3 > ￿2 = ￿4.
Further assume that agents 1 and 2 are full Bayesian learners whereas agent 3 is an
optimistic and agent 4 is a pessimistic Bayesian learner. If the attitudes of agents
1 and 2 become strictly polarized, then the attitudes of agents 3 and 4 are even
more polarized, i.e.,
E [~ ￿;￿3 (￿ j I
￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿ j I
￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿ j I
￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿4 (￿ j I
￿)].
8 Conclusion
To account for the empirical phenomena of ￿myside bias￿ and ￿irrational belief per-
sistence￿in people￿ s learning behavior we propose formal models of Bayesian learning
where the interpretation of new information is prone to psychological biases. Based on a
23simpli￿ed representation of ambiguous beliefs we develop parsimonious representations
of the agent￿ s initial beliefs and updating processes. We thereby focus attention on
three alternative updating rules that are characterized by di⁄erent degrees of optimism,
respectively pessimism, in the interpretation of new information. As a speci￿c feature
of our approach, the resulting models of Bayesian learning with psychological attitudes
reduce to a standard model of rational Bayesian learning in the absence of ambiguity.
However, we show that this standard model of rational Bayesian learning alone results
in convergent beliefs and is therefore not a suitable framework to account for phenomena
such as a myside bias.
We then develop a two heterogeneous agents setting to derive divergent posterior
beliefs and attitude polarization for the agents￿ learning processes under ambiguity.
Attitude polarization is de￿ned as a stronger condition than divergent beliefs in that the
posterior beliefs of the two agents move into opposite directions. While we assume that
the agents receive the same information, the agents may have di⁄erent prior beliefs or
apply di⁄erent learning rules. Two main ￿ndings emerge:
1. We may observe divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization for agents
who have identical attitudes with respect to the interpretation of new information
but have di⁄erent initial attitudes with respect to optimism, resp. pessimism,
under ambiguity.
2. We may observe divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization in case the
agents have identical initial attitudes with respect to optimism, resp. pessimism,
under ambiguity but have di⁄erent attitudes with respect to the interpretation of
new information.
Our stylized models of Bayesian thus formally accommodate two alternative scenar-
ios of a ￿myside bias￿ . In a ￿rst scenario, a ￿myside bias￿arises because of personal
attitudes towards the resolution of ambiguity. In a second scenario, a ￿myside bias￿
corresponds to personal attitudes towards the interpretation of information. While the
psychological studies quoted in the introduction provide empirical evidence for the phe-
nomenon of attitude polarization, they cannot di⁄erentiate between these two alternative
explanations for the phenomenon. It would therefore be interesting to gather more em-
pirical evidence on updating and learning with non-additive beliefs. In this respect, our
formal model may be useful for designing experiments that speci￿cally look at the issue
of Bayesian updating of ambiguous beliefs.
In future research we aim to apply our approach to topics in information economics
that are typically analyzed under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning such as
￿ctitious play in strategic games (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps 1993; Fudenberg and
24Levine 1995; Krishna and Sjostrom 1998) or no-trade results (see, e.g., Milgrom and
Stokey 1982; Morris 1994; Neeman 1996; Zimper 2007). Along the line of heterogeneous
agent models that depart from the rational expectations or rational Bayesian learning
paradigms, our approach may also have promising implications for asset pricing models
(see, e.g., Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark 2000; Abel 2002; Ludwig and Zimper 2007) and
theories of endogenous speculative bubbles (see, e.g., the discussion in Kurz 1996).
25Appendix
Proof of observation 2: By an argument in Schmeidler (1986), it su¢ ces to restrict




￿ f! 2 ￿ j Y (!) ￿ zgdz,




￿ f! 2 ￿ j Y (!) ￿ zgdz (22)




n = f! 2 ￿ j ak;n < X (!) ￿ bk;ng for k = 1;:::;2
n
such that
ak;n = [maxY ￿ minY ] ￿
(k ￿ 1)
2n + minY
bk;n = [maxY ￿ minY ] ￿
k
2n + minY .
De￿ne the step functions an : ￿ ! R and bn : ￿ ! R such that, for ! 2 Ak
n, k = 1;:::;2n,
an (!) = ak;n
bn (!) = bk;n.
Obviously,
E [an;￿] ￿ E [Y;￿] ￿ E [bn;￿]
for all n and
lim
n!1E [bn;￿] ￿ E [an;￿] = 0.
That is, E [an;￿] and E [bn;￿] converge to E [Y;￿] for n ! 1. Furthermore, observe
that
minan = minY for all n, and
maxbn = maxY for all n.
Since limn!1 minbn = limn!1 minan and E [bn;￿] is continuous in n, we have
lim
n!1E [bn;￿] = ￿
￿
￿ lim
n!1maxbn + (1 ￿ ￿) lim
n!1minbn
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿) lim
n!1E [bn;￿]
= ￿ (￿maxY + (1 ￿ ￿)minY ) + (1 ￿ ￿)E [Y;￿].
26In order to prove proposition 3, it therefore remains to be shown that, for all n,
E [bn;￿] = ￿ (￿maxbn + (1 ￿ ￿)minbn) + (1 ￿ ￿)E [bn;￿].





































implying for a neo-additive capacity
E [bn;￿] = maxbn
￿




































+ minbn [￿ ￿ ￿￿]
= ￿ (￿maxbn + (1 ￿ ￿)minbn) + (1 ￿ ￿)E [bn;￿].
￿
Proof of observation 4: An application of the full Bayesian update rule to a
neo-additive capacity gives
￿
FB (A j B) =
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B)
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B) + 1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A [ :B))
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B)
1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(A \ B) ￿ ￿(A [ :B))
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B)
1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(A \ B) ￿ ￿(A) ￿ ￿(:B) + ￿(A \ :B))
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B)
1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿￿(:B))
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
+
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)










￿ ￿(A j B)
with ￿
FB
B given by (10).￿
27Proof of observation 5: An application of the optimistic Bayesian update rule to
a neo-additive capacity gives
￿
opt (A j B) =
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A \ B)
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
+
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)















￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
.
￿
Proof of observation 6: An application of the pessimistic Bayesian update rule to
a neo-additive capacity gives
￿
pess (A j B) =
￿ (A [ :B) ￿ ￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ (:B)
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A [ :B) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:B)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:B)
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:(:A \ B)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:B)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:B)
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(:A \ B)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(B))
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:B)
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(B) ￿ ￿(:A \ B))
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(:B))
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(B) ￿ ￿(B)￿(:A j B))
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(:B))
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(B) ￿ ￿(B)(1 ￿ ￿(A j B)))
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(:B)
= (1 ￿ ￿
pess





￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(B)
.
￿









































I￿ , for all ￿￿ i⁄
￿
FB




￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
<
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
,
￿ < 1.
Turn now to the inequality
E [~ ￿;￿

































I￿ ￿ ￿ ,
￿
FB
I￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) < ￿
pess
I￿ ,
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
<
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
,
0 < ￿.
This proves the ￿rst part of the observation. The second part readily follows from the
assumption that ￿(I￿) < 1.￿
Proof of proposition 1.
Part (i). Observe at ￿rst that inequality (19) is satis￿ed if and only if ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
Obviously, if ￿1 = ￿2 then (18) must be violated. Thus we can restrict attention to




















> ￿ ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E [~ ￿;￿(￿)] ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E [~ ￿;￿(￿)]),
which is equivalent to
￿
FB
I￿ > ￿ ,
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(I￿)
> ￿,
and therefore holds if and only if ￿ 2 (0;1) since ￿(I￿) < 1.￿
Part (ii). Again, observe at ￿rst that inequality (19) is satis￿ed if and only if










￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
pess
I￿ ) ￿ ￿
￿
> ￿ ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E [~ ￿;￿(￿)] ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E [~ ￿;￿(￿)])












￿ > ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿2): (23)
If ￿ = 0, the l.h.s. as well as the r.h.s. of (23) equal zero. Thus, ￿ > 0 is a necessary
condition for (23) to hold. In what follows we prove that ￿ > 0 is also a su¢ cient





I￿ ￿ 0. (24)
Since the l.h.s. of (23) is then continuously strictly decreasing in ￿￿ and, by assumption,
￿￿ 2 (0;1), (23) is satis￿ed for all ￿￿ if and only if
￿
pess
I￿ ￿ ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿2) ,
1 ￿ ￿2
￿(1 ￿ ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(I￿)
￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2,
which is obviously true for all ￿1;￿2 since
1 ￿ ￿2
￿(1 ￿ ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(I￿)
￿ 1 ￿ ￿2.
This proves the claim for case (24).





I￿ > 0. (25)
Since the l.h.s. of (23) is then continuously strictly increasing in ￿￿ 2 (0;1), (23) is











￿ ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿2) ,
￿
pess
I￿ ￿ ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿2) ,
1 ￿ ￿2
￿(1 ￿ ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(I￿)
￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2,
which is obviously true for all ￿1;￿2. This proves that ￿ > 0 is su¢ cient for (23) to hold.
￿￿
Proof of proposition 2.
Part (i). By the corollary and the assumption that E [~ ￿;￿(￿)] = ￿￿ equation (20)
implies
E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿ j I





















30which holds if and only if ￿1 > ￿2 so that the middle inequality in (20) is also strict.
Focus now on the inequalities
E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿ j I










￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿
and
E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿)] > E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿ j I
￿)] ,











which are implied by (20) under the assumption that E [~ ￿;￿(￿)] = ￿￿. Observe that these
inequalities require ￿ 2 (0;1) since ￿ 2 f0;1g would imply ￿
FB
I￿ = ￿. As a consequence
of ￿ 2 (0;1), we have from the corollary that ￿
FB
I￿ > ￿ because ￿(I￿) < 1 so that the
above inequalities hold if and only if
￿1 > ￿
￿ > ￿2,
which proves the result. ￿
Part (ii). By the corollary, the inequality E [~ ￿;￿1 (￿)] ￿ E [~ ￿;￿2 (￿)] in (20) holds if





1 (￿ j I
￿)
￿










￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E [~ ￿;￿(￿)]










￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿1: (26)
Observe that ￿ > 0 is a necessary condition for (26) to hold. In what follows we prove
that ￿ > 0 is also su¢ cient. Let ￿ > 0 and consider at ￿rst the case that
￿ ￿ ￿
opt
I￿ ￿ 0. (27)
Since the l.h.s. of (26) is then continuously strictly decreasing in ￿￿ 2 (0;1), (26) is
satis￿ed for all ￿￿ if and only if
￿
opt
I￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ,
1
￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(I￿)
￿ 1,
which is obviously satis￿ed. This proves the claim for case (27).
31Let ￿ > 0 and consider now the converse case
￿ ￿ ￿
opt
I￿ > 0. (28)
Since the l.h.s. of (26) is then continuously strictly increasing in ￿￿ 2 (0;1), (26) is
satis￿ed for all ￿￿ if and only if
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1,
which is obviously satis￿ed. This proves our claim that ￿ > 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for (26) to hold.￿￿
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